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Abstract: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) suffer from many security attacks when deployed either in 
remote or hostile environments. Among possible attacks, the Sybil attack is one of the severe attacks in 
which malicious nodes report false identities and location information such that the remaining nodes 
believe that many nodes exist in their vicinity. The current study proposes a method for detecting Sybil 
attack using sequential analysis.  This method works in two stages. First, it collects the evidences by 
observing neighboring node activities. Further, the collected evidences are consolidated to provide 
input to the second stage. In the second stage, collected evidences are validated using the sequential 
probability ratio test to decide whether the neighbor node is Sybil or benign. The proposed method has 
been evaluated using the network simulator ns-2. Simulation results show that the proposed method is 
robust in detecting Sybil attacks with very low false positive and false negative rates. 
 
Index terms: Sensor networks, Sybil attacks, malicious activities, sequential analysis, received 
signal strength, false identity, false location information. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are composed of many low-cost and tiny sensing and 
communication devices (also called as nodes) configured with limited memory, processing 
capability and energy resource [1]. These nodes are often deployed in remote and hostile 
environments to perform mission critical tasks. In such environments, an adversary can 
physically capture and tamper the nodes such that the tampered node distorts the network 
operations by launching various security attacks. Among possible attacks, the Sybil attack is a 
severe attack in which a compromised node sends out false identity and/or location information 
such that the remaining nodes believe that many nodes exist in their vicinity. A compromised 
node can launch the Sybil attack using stolen or fabricated identities and/or location information. 
An attacker may launch Sybil attacks in three ways as follows [2, 3, 31] 
1) During the direct or indirect communication with the malicious nodes. 
2) using fabricated or stolen information. During fabrication, an attacker generates 
arbitrarily new identities or location data. Whereas, with stolen information an attacker 
assigns valid identity or location data to a compromised node. 
3) A malicious node could attack simultaneously by sending out all fabricated identities 
or non-simultaneously by sending out each false identity at a time.    
Since node identities and location data are vital to the network operations such as routing, data 
aggregation, clustering, cluster head election, distributed storage, resource allocation, and others 
[2], the network performance degrades substantially if Sybil attacks are present in the network. 
There exist several promising applications of WSNs such as monitoring and control of industrial 
equipment, home automation, patient monitoring, environmental monitoring, climate change 
monitoring, detecting hazardous chemical levels, combat field surveillance, remotely detecting 
or controlling landmines, intrusion detection, criminal hunting, and others [4-8]. These 
applications need the node identity and location information to process the sensor data at the 
destination. The advantages of such applications can be fully utilized only if nodes report the 
correct identity and location data.   
To this end, the Sybil attack has been widely studied by the researchers and proposed a number 
of methods in the literature [9-34].  However, existing methods require costly requirements such 
as relay nodes placement [9], directional antennas [10], cryptography methods [11-15, 42], etc. 
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However, these methods increase overhead and not suitable for the resource-limited sensor 
nodes. Therefore, a simple and efficient method is required for resource constrained WSNs to 
detect Sybil attacks without additional overhead. To this end, the current study presents a node-
centric method for Sybil Attack Detection using Sequential Analysis (SADSA). The SADSA 
method works in two phases: evidence collection and evidence validation. In the existing 
literature, nodes in a network are categorized into benign or malicious based on certain 
parameters (or evidences). These evidences could be message authentication [11], random 
passwords [12], signal strength [16, 26], Time Difference of Arrival (TODA) [17], location 
verification [18-22], trust values [23], identifying common neighbors [25, 26], energy and hop 
count [28], traffic monitoring [29], signal print [30], and others. By having the evidences, Sybil 
attack detection methods analyze and classify the malicious nodes from benign nodes. To this 
end, similar treatment has been considered for the proposed SADSA method. In the first stage, 
nodes consider location data of neighbors, Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) and 
timestamp of the messages received from neighbors as evidences. The collected evidences are 
consolidated to provide inputs to the second phase. In the second phase, the consolidated 
evidences are validated using the sequential probability ratio test to determine whether the 
neighbor node is benign or Sybil. In this way, these two phases are repeated for each evidence 
throughout the network operation. The advantage of the proposed method is that it does not 
require special hardware, heavy communication process, heavy computation, and high memory 
requirements as the nodes obtain RSS of messages without any additional hardware 
requirements. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related works on Sybil 
attack detection. Section III presents the preliminaries, system model, and assumptions 
considered for SADSA method. Section IV describes the proposed SADSA method. Section V 
presents the performance evaluation of the SADSA method using a simulation study. Finally, 
Section VI concludes the paper with the future scope. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
Douceur et al. [32] first coined the term Sybil attacks in the realm of network security. The 
authors defined the Sybil attack in a peer-to-peer network as damaging nodes’ reputation by 
duplicating their identities. In another study, Abu-Ghazaleh et al. [33] studied that reporting false 
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location information by a malicious node as Sybil attack. It is because, in location-based routing 
protocols, location data of nodes are important to route the packets from the source to the 
destination. Shan et al. [21] introduced location-based attack with multiple counterfeit identities 
on WSN localization process. Authors analyzed the impact of false identities and location on the 
localization process. Therefore, a malicious node is said to be Sybil if it reports false identity 
and/or location information to distort the network operations. The following section in sequel 
presents the related work on Sybil attack detection methods considering false identity and false 
location data. Conventional cryptography methods come into force when there is a need for 
security in distributed networks. Newsome et al. [31] showed that Sybil attacks are extremely 
harmful to the sensor networks and proposed security measures using random key distribution 
techniques. However, cryptography operations are more expensive in terms of processing and 
storage capabilities. Thus, they are not suitable for resource constrained WSNs.  
Ssu et al. [24] proposed a Sybil attack detection method using neighboring information 
(DSANI). Nodes running this method detect the Sybil identities by analyzing the neighboring 
node information. To do this, when a node A suspects there is a Sybil attack, it sends out a 
Request-Reply (RR) message to one of its neighbor B. In turn, node B broadcast a neighbor reply 
message over its maximum communication range. The purpose of an RR message is to seek all 
its neighbors to send a reply message to the request originator A. Then, node A maintains a 
record of node identities of replied nodes to form a Common Neighbor Set (CNS) of nodes A 
and B. In this way, each node repeats this process for each neighbor node. Finally, node A counts 
how many times each neighbor identity has appeared in CNS. From this count, node identities 
that appear below a threshold value (𝜃)  are predicted as Sybil identities. The 𝜃  value is 
calculated as 0.7*|𝑁𝑐 |, where 𝑁𝑐  is the number of neighbors. To avoid false detection, the 
aforementioned process will be repeated by reducing the communication range until the Sybil 
identities fall outside of nodes vicinity.  Although this method has shown significant Sybil 
identities detection rate, adjusting communication range and sending a request message to each 
neighbor as part of preparing CNS can lead to high communication overhead. Therefore, such 
heavy communication process is not suitable for resource constrained WSNs. Reza et al. [25] 
proposed a method to detect Sybil attacks using two-hop messages. It is an extension of Ssu et al. 
[24] method. However, this method also suffers from high communication overhead like DSANI 
method.   
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Ho et al. [26] proposed a replica cluster detection method using sequential analysis. In this, 
malicious nodes forge identities of benign nodes and launch various attacks by creating duplicate 
clusters. The proposed method prepares a test statistic by observing the distinction in the 
messages sent by the nodes. This test statistic is compared against two thresholds to run 
sequential hypothesis testing. The simulation results have shown that this method has high 
malicious node detection rate with the low false positive and false negative rate.  
Vasudeva et al. [35] proposed a method to detect Sybil attacks on lowest identity-based 
clustering algorithms. In these algorithms, a node with the lowest identity is selected as the 
cluster head for processing the data. In this work, the malicious nodes disrupt the cluster 
formation process by sending out low identity numbers. Nodes running this method detect 
malicious activities by validating each neighbor’s information. Like Ssu et al. [24] method, this 
method collects the neighbors information by varying the transmission range. 
Golestani et al. [29] proposed a Sybil attack detection method to improve the security of WSNs 
for smart grids. This method works by analyzing the traffic on the network. It assumes that the 
traffic density will be more around the Sybil nodes. Each node observes the traffic density in its 
vicinity and detects the malicious nodes by analyzing the traffic using k-means clustering and 
averaging methods.  
Li et al. [27] proposed Regional Statistics Detection (RSD) method for identifying Sybil attacks. 
It is a distributed detection algorithm. This method uses RSSI of messages to detect the Sybil 
identities. The detection process has three steps. In the first step, nodes record the RSSI of the 
messages received from their neighbors. Each node enters this record into its RSSI-ID table. In 
the second step, each node identifies the neighbor node identities with the same RSSI values. In 
the third step, each node checks for common identities having same RSSI values in the RSSI-ID 
tables of neighbor nodes. Then, such common identities are considered as Sybil identities. 
Finally, messages of common identities are blocked in the network operations. This method 
works fine with small networks. However, it suffers from high false detection rate in the large 
networks due to two reasons. First, when nodes are randomly placed in the network, they could 
receive messages with same RSSI values. Second, the communication range can deviate due to 
the presence of noise.  
Sharmila et al. [28] proposed energy and hop based Sybil attack detection method for mobile 
wireless sensor networks. This method uses node residual energy and hop count of nodes as 
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evidences to detect the Sybil attack. This method works in three stages. First, each node collects 
the residual energy information of its neighbors and compares them against a threshold value. 
Second, the distance between a suspected malicious node and a suspecting node is calculated. In 
the third step, the path taken by the packets is recorded. Information obtained from the three 
stages is analyzed to confirm a suspected identity as a Sybil identity. This method can lead to 
high error rate if a malicious node deliberately reports false residual energy.  
Karupiah et al. [36] proposed an energy efficient Sybil attack detection method called Sybil 
Secure. In this method, nodes in the network are grouped into clusters and a cluster head (CH) is 
selected from the cluster members to initiate the Sybil attack detection process. CH periodically 
sends out a query message asking the cluster members to respond. In turn, each cluster member 
responds to the CH request. Then, CH collects the information such as the identities of nodes that 
are not replied within a response period, node identities whose details are similar to previous 
records, and nodes that sent different location coordinates. Finally, Sybil Secure method analyzes 
this collection to identify Sybil identities.  
Bin et al. [34] proposed Sybil attack detection methods based on communication ranging in 
WSNs. These methods work with the help of anchor nodes. These methods assume that 
malicious nodes perform the Sybil attack from a fixed location in the network. When a node 
receives the beacon message from its neighbors, it calculates the polar distance by measuring the 
polar angle. A Sybil attack is detected when the polar distance of different nodes is less than a 
threshold value. However, this method requires additional hardware setup such as anchor nodes.  
From the aforementioned literature, it is observed that each method its own strengths and 
limitations. Most of the methods are based on conventional cryptography, use of additional 
hardware setup such as anchor nodes, and having heavy communication process. In general, 
nodes have to execute the attack detection methods in conjunction with the application protocols. 
To this end, a node-centric approach is required to detect the Sybil attacks efficiently without 
additional overheads.  
 
III. PRELIMINARIES, SYSTEM MODEL, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
a. Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)  
Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) is a statistical hypothesis testing method that was 
developed by Wald [38]. Unlike conventional hypothesis testing, SPRT works without having 
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fixed sample size. It has become a promising testing method to detect defective items in 
manufacturing industries. A detailed survey on SPRT applications can be found in [39-41]. 
SPRT is modeled as a random walk with a lower and upper bound. In this random walk, the 
decision-making process will start at a point in the two bounds and move towards any of the two 
bounds depending on the input evidences. When the random walk reaches or exceeds the upper 
bound, SPRT rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternate hypothesis. On the other hand, 
if the random walk reaches or exceeds the lower bound, SPRT accepts the null hypothesis and 
rejects the alternate hypothesis. Let 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . , 𝑥𝑛 be the evidences and then for each incoming 
evidence the SPRT prepares a test statistic T(X) and compare it against two thresholds 𝑡𝑙 and 𝑡𝑢 
respectively to choose a decision among three alternatives. First, accept the null hypothesis 
if  𝑇(𝑋) ≤ 𝑡𝑙 . Second, accept the alternate hypothesis if  𝑇(𝑥)  ≥  𝑡𝑢 . Finally, computing test 
statistic one more time if 𝑡𝑙  <  𝑇(𝑥)  <  𝑡𝑢. Further, the test will be carried out using the user 
configured false positive and false negative values. The main advantage of SPRT is the test 
terminates with few pieces of evidences.  
 
b. System model and assumptions 
This study considers an insecure, homogeneous and static wireless sensor network. The 
following assumptions are considered for the study. 
 Each node has a fixed communication range R.  
 An adversary can compromise nodes in the network with a certain probability.  
 Each node has a unique identity.  
 Each node is aware of its location information. For example, the CC2431 system-on-chip 
solution based on the IEEE 802.15.4 specification is popular for obtaining location 
information. This chip has the advantage of CC2420 transceiver and location detection 
module [44, 45].  
 Each node periodically broadcast a beacon message consists of its identity and location 
information to know about their neighbors. 
 Each node maintains an observation table to store the neighbor nodes information. This 
table consists of the fields such as neighboring node identity, location information, 
Received Signal Strength (RSS), estimated distance, Euclidian distance, and timestamp. 
 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON SMART SENSING AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS VOL. 9, NO. 2, JUNE 2016 
657
c. Adversary model 
Both the benign and malicious nodes are with similar hardware configuration. Initially, it is 
assumed that there are no malicious nodes in the network. Malicious nodes appear in the network 
after some time from the network initialization. It is assumed that, during the network operations, 
an adversary captures and tampers one or more benign nodes and place them back on the 
network. These tampered nodes fabricate a set of false identities (FI) and location data (LD). 
Using this set, a malicious node launch non-simultaneous Sybil attack as mentioned in any one 
of the following cases: 
Case-1: A malicious node sends out a false identity with correct location data. 
Case-2: A malicious node sends out its correct identity with false location data. 
Case-3: A malicious node sends out both false identity and false location data.   
 
IV. SYBIL ATTACK DETECTION USING SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS (SADSA) 
As showed in Figure 1, the proposed SADSA method consists of two phases: 1) evidence 
collection and 2) evidence validation. As allude in section I, nodes in a network has to be 
categorized as benign or malicious based on some parameters. Such parameters are gathered in 
the evidence collection phase. 
 
Figure 1: Flow diagram of the SADSA method 
SADSA method considers these parameters as evidences. In the first phase, nodes running 
SADSA method extracts the evidences from the beacons received from the neighbor nodes. In 
the second phase, SADSA method consolidates the collected evidences and proceeds for 
validation. The main objective of validating the evidences is to detect the Sybil nodes with a 
minimum number of evidences. To do this, each node in the network runs SPRT to identify the 
Sybil attack. With SPRT, a node can accept a hypothesis between two competing hypotheses (H0 
P. Raghu Vamsi and Krishna Kant, DETECTING SYBIL ATTACKS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS USING SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS
658
(null): neighboring node is not a Sybil node, H1 (alternate): neighboring node is a Sybil node). 
The following section in the sequel explains these two phases. 
 
a. Evidence collection  
The evidence is a fact by which a node is to be decided as malicious or benign. Evidence 
collection deals with gathering and consolidating all such facts. To do this, nodes running 
SADSA method use the information available in beacon messages. Recall that each node 
periodically sends out a beacon message that consists of identity and location information. Let us 
consider that the time domain of each sensor node is divided into non-overlapping time 
intervals (Δtn). During these time intervals, let a node 𝑆𝑖 receives the beacon message from one 
of its neighbors 𝑆𝑗 then 𝑆𝑖 collect the evidences as a series of binary values to simplify further 
computation. A node can receive messages from all the nodes within its communication 
radius 𝑅. When 𝑆𝑖 receives a message from its neighbor, it records the details such as neighbor 
node identity, location data, RSSI of the beacon, estimated distance via RSSI, Euclidean 
distance, and a timestamp of beacon in its observation table. The rest of this section explains how 
a node extracts evidences from this record. 
 Evidence of direct observation 
 
Figure 2: Network scenario 
Let 𝑇𝑆𝑖  and 𝑇𝑆𝑖+1  are the two successive time-stamps of beacon messages received from 
neighbor 𝑆𝑗, then evidence from direct observation 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) is estimated as follows 
𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) = {
1, |𝑇𝑆𝑖 − 𝑇𝑆𝑖+1| ≤ 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  (1) 
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It means 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) become 1 if the difference between two successive time-stamps is less than 
the maximum beacon period 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥. Otherwise, direct observation becomes 0. In other words, a 
benign node will always send out a beacon message within 𝐵𝑚𝑎𝑥. For example, in Figure 2, there 
are nine nodes in which node 1 is the malicious node. Node 1 fabricates five Sybil identities. 
When node 1 performs non-simultaneous a attack, a false identity will be sent out with each 
beacon packet during a beacon interval. Neighbors of node 1 receive the beacon with only one 
identity at a time. Therefore, when malicious nodes perform non-simultaneous a Sybil attack, 
messages from a Sybil identity may be received in different beacon intervals. Thus, using time-
stamps, this fact can be identified using Eq. (1).   
 
 Evidence of distance measurement 
There are two concepts in distance measurement: signal distance (SD) and Euclidean distance 
(ED). SD is the distance measured using RSS. In a homogeneous wireless network, nodes can 
obtain the RSSI of a message received from its neighbor without additional hardware 
requirements. Further, the distance between a node and its neighbor can be calculated using the 
radio propagation model as follows 
𝑃𝑟
𝑃𝑡
= 𝑘 (
𝑑0
𝑑
)
𝛾
           (2) 
In Eq. (2), 𝑃𝑡 , 𝑃𝑟 , 𝑑0, 𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 respectively are the transmitted power of the packet, receiving 
power of the packet, near earth reference distance (in meters), estimated distance between the 
nodes, and free space measurement. The value of k is calculated as 𝑘 = (
𝜆
4𝜋𝑑0
)
2
 [16], and 𝛾 is 
the path loss index. It depends on radio propagation model or deployment environment. 
Therefore, with E.q (2), the distance 𝑑  is calculated. We consider this 𝑑  as the estimated 
distance (𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒).  
On the other hand, the Euclidean distance is the distance measured using the location data of 
nodes. Since each node is aware of its location, they can calculate the ED with the location data 
available in the beacon messages. Let (𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) be the location data of node 𝑆𝑖 and (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗) be the 
location data of node  𝑆𝑗 , then the Euclidean distance between two nodes is calculated 
as  𝐸𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗) = √(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)
2
+ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗)
2
 . With ED, the evidence of distance measurement is 
obtained as follows 
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𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗) = {
1, |𝐸𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗) − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒| ≤ 𝐷𝑡ℎ
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
   (4) 
From Eq. (3), the 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗) becomes 1 if the difference between 𝐸𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗) and the estimated 
distance is less than or equal to a distance threshold 𝐷𝑡ℎ. Otherwise, it becomes 0. However, in 
real environments the communication link between two nodes is not symmetric due to 
environmental factors such as noise. Usually, noise factor in communication is estimated via 
training. The current study models the noise as a zero mean Gaussian noise (0, 𝜎𝑛), Where, 𝜎𝑛 is 
the noise variance in between [-0.5, +0.5]. 
  
 Evidence of location verification 
A node initiates the location verification when 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 becomes 0 (from Eq. (4)). Localization 
and location verification are two procedures used to derive and verify the location data. 
Localization is the process of deriving a blind node’s (i.e., a node which is unaware of its 
location) location with the help of known locations. Triangulation [22] is a popular method used 
to obtain the blind node’s location data. Location verification is the process of verifying location 
claims. There exists several secure location verification algorithms in the literature [18, 19]. 
These algorithms work with the help of special verification devices, centralized authorities, relay 
nodes, etc. It means a node has to verify a location claim with the help of known locations. 
Further, algorithms assume that the devices help for location verification is trustworthy. 
However, such assumptions do not hold in practice when WSNs are deployed in remote and 
hostile environments. To this end, the current study presents a simple and efficient location 
verification process without additional overhead. The key aspect of this is, each node assesses 
the sincerity in providing the information by its neighbors. This is said to be trust value of 
neighbors. Then, nodes initiate the triangulation localization process with the location data of 
two highly trusted nodes and location reported by a malicious node.  
 
 Trust value calculation 
Consider a localization scenario shown in Figure 3. In this, node A, B, and D are benign nodes 
and node C is a malicious node. D is within the communication radius of A, B and C. Node C 
deliberately sends out false location data to disrupt the network operations. Since D is within the 
communication radius of C, it receives the beacons sent by C. At this time, D has to prove C as 
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malicious by verifying the location claim. Generally, in the localization process, a blind node 
requires at least three correct locations to derive its locations in a two-dimensional network 
deployment. 
In the current work, since D is aware of its location, it requires at least two benign neighbors 
location to verify the location claim of C. Therefore, calculating the trust value of neighbors 
helps to identify two benign nodes.  To do this, each node maintains two counters to record the 
success (𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) and failure (𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) of neighbor’s information. 
  
Figure 3: Localization scenario 
Initially, these two counters are set to zero. A node 𝑆𝑗  is said to be sincere when its 
corresponding evidences are true, i.e., AND operation of 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  is 1. If 𝑆𝑗 found 
sincere then, 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗) is incremented by one unit. Otherwise, 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗) is incremented by one 
unit. In this way, each node records the success and failure counters for each of its neighbor 
nodes. With these counters, each node periodically calculates the trust value of its neighbors as 
[37] 
𝑇(𝑆𝑗) =
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗)+1
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗)+𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗)+2
  (5) 
Where, 𝑇(𝑆𝑗) is the trust value of node 𝑆𝑗. The trust value is 0.5 during the initial stage (i.e., 
when 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗) = 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗) = 0). It means, each node is trustworthy during the initial stages 
of the network. However, the trust value increases with respect to the increase in success count 
and decreases with respect to increase in failure count. A node having trust value greater than or 
equal to 0.5 is considered as trustworthy. During evidence gathering, if a node observes 
distinction in the evidences then it initiates the location verification. 
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  Location verification 
Recall the scenario in Figure 3, consider that D has identified A, B as highly trusted nodes and it 
has to verify the location claim of C. At this time, D knows its actual location (AL), location data 
reported by A, B and C. Now, D estimates its locations (EL) with the help of location data of A, 
B, and C. The localization process will be carried out as follows [22]: 
Consider the general equation of the circle as shown below   
𝑑2 = 𝑥2 + 𝑦2      (6) 
From Figure 3, let (𝑥1, 𝑦1), (𝑥2, 𝑦2), (𝑥3, 𝑦3), and (𝑥, 𝑦) be the location data of nodes A, B, C 
and D respectively, the labels 𝑑1, 𝑑2 and 𝑑3 respectively on the edges be the estimated distance 
(using Eq. (2)) between the node pairs (D, A), (D, B) and (D, C), then the Eq.(6) can be modified 
for A, B and C as 
𝑑1
2 = (𝑥 − 𝑥1)
2 + (𝑦 − 𝑦1)
2                (7) 
𝑑2
2 = (𝑥 − 𝑥2)
2 + (𝑦 − 𝑦2)
2                 (8) 
𝑑3
2 = (𝑥 − 𝑥3)
2 + (𝑦 − 𝑦3)
2                 (9) 
Then, location D(𝑥, 𝑦) can be calculated using Eq. (6), Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) as follows 
𝐷 = 𝐴−1𝑏                 (10) 
The parameters in Eq. (10) is expressed as 
𝐴 = 2 [
𝑥1 − 𝑥3 𝑦1 − 𝑦3
𝑥2 − 𝑥3 𝑦2 − 𝑦3
]   (11) 
𝑏 = [
𝑥1
2 − 𝑥3
2 + 𝑦1
2 − 𝑦3
2 − 𝑑1
2 + 𝑑3
2
𝑥2
2 − 𝑥3
2 + 𝑦2
2 − 𝑦3
2 − 𝑑2
2 + 𝑑3
2]  (12) 
𝐷 = [
𝑥
𝑦]     (13) 
The estimated location (EL) of D is obtained using the following: 
𝐷 = (𝐴𝑇𝐴)−1𝐴𝑇𝑏     (14) 
Once the EL is calculated, D obtains the evidence of location verification as follows 
𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑐(𝐷, 𝐶) = {
1, 𝐸𝐷(𝐸𝐿, 𝐴𝐿) ≤ 𝐸𝑡ℎ
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
   (15) 
Where, EL and AL are the estimated location and actual location of the verifying node (i.e., D). 
The 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑐(𝐷, 𝐶) will become 1 if the Euclidean distance between the EL and AL is less than or 
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equal to a localization error threshold 𝐸𝑡ℎ . Otherwise, it becomes 0. We consider 𝐸𝑡ℎ  as 0.5 
meters. Algorithm 1 shows the procedure of evidence collection and location verification. 
Algorithm 1: Evidence collection and location verification in SADSA method 
Input Beacon from neighbor node 𝑆𝑗 consists of node identity, location 
data. 
Initialization 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗) = 0, 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗) = 0 
Output Evidences in binary values 
 Start Procedure 
Step 1 Record the node identity, location data, RSSI of the beacon, 
Euclidean distance, signal distance and timestamp of the beacon 
in the neighbor table.  
  
Step 2 Calculate the evidence of direct observation  (𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡)  
using Eq. (1) 
  
Step 3 Calculate the signal distance using Eq. (2) and Euclidean distance 
with the reported location data. Then, calculate the evidence of 
distance measurement (𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) using Eq. (4).  
  
Step 4 If 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is 0, then increment the 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗) by 1. 
Otherwise, increment the 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑆𝑗) by 1.  
  
Step 5 If 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 0, then perform the steps 6. Otherwise, set evidence 
of location verification 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑐 = 1 and go to step 7. 
  
Step 6 Initiate location verification 
  
Step 6.1 Calculate the trust value of each neighbor using Eq. (5) 
  
Step 6.2  Identify two neighbors with the trust value greater than or equal to 
0.5. 
  
Step 6.3  Estimate the verification node location using Eq. (14). 
  
Step 6.4 Calculate the evidence of location verification 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑐 using Eq. (15).  
  
Step 7 Return 𝐸_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 and 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑐.  
Stop the procedure. 
  
 In this way, nodes gather the evidence of direct observation, distance measurement, and location 
verification. An adversary may launch Sybil attack in three cases (see Section III (c)): 1) a 
malicious node sends out a false identity with correct location data (case-1); 2) a malicious node 
sends out its correct identity with false location data (case-2), and 3) a malicious node sends out 
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both false identity and false location data (case-3). Although each node collects the evidences, 
the possibility of Sybil attack in the above three cases can be identified only by systematic 
analysis. To do this, collected evidences are consolidated and then proceeds to the validation 
phase. The objective of the evidence consolidation is to provide a binary value to the validation 
phase. The evidences are consolidated as follows 
𝐸𝑐1 = 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) ⊗ 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗)  (16) 
𝐸𝑐2 = 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) ⊗ 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑐(𝑖, 𝑗)  (17) 
𝐸𝑐3 = 𝐸𝑐1 ⨀ 𝐸𝑐2    (18) 
Where, 𝐸𝑐1, 𝐸𝑐2 and 𝐸𝑐3 are consolidated evidences respectively used to identify the case 1, 2, 
and 3 attacks. The symbol ⊗ indicates the exclusive-OR operation and ⨀ indicates the logical 
AND operation. With these values, malicious activities can be identified. For example, if 
𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 1  and  𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 0 , then  𝐸𝑐1 = 1 . It means that a malicious node is within the 
communication radius and sending the false identities in different beacon intervals. Similarly, if 
𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑐 = 1 and 𝐸𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 0, then 𝐸𝑐1 = 1. It means that a malicious node is sending the beacons 
within the beacon interval with false location data. The case 3 attack can be identified by 
performing AND operation of 𝐸𝑐1 and 𝐸𝑐2. Algorithm 2 shows the procedure of consolidating 
the collected evidences. Using these consolidated evidences, SADSA method proceeds to the 
evidence validation phase. 
Algorithm 2: Evidence consolidation in SADSA method 
Input Evidence values 𝐸_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐸_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, and 𝐸_𝑙𝑜𝑐 
Output Consolidated evidences 𝐸𝑐1 (for case 1),  
𝐸𝑐2 (for case 2) and 𝐸_𝑐3 (for case 3) 
 Start Procedure 
Step 1 Prepare the consolidated evidence for identifying case 1  
attacks (𝐸𝑐1) using Eq. (16) 
  
Step 2 Prepare the consolidated evidence for identifying case 2  
attacks (𝐸𝑐2) using Eq. (17) 
  
Step 3 Prepare the consolidated evidence for identifying case 3  
attacks (𝐸𝑐3) using Eq. (18) 
  
Step 4 Return 𝐸𝑐1, 𝐸𝑐2 and 𝐸𝑐3. 
Stop the procedure. 
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b. Evidence validation 
The aim of evidence validation phase is to decide a node as either malicious or benign with a 
minimum number of evidences. Consolidated evidence values (Eq. (16), Eq. (17) and Eq. (18)) 
result into a series of binary values and they are assigned to a Bernoulli random variable 𝑋𝑖 to 
represent 1 as (true/success) and 0 as (false/failure) in identifying malicious node. It is 
formulated as 
𝑋𝑖 = {
1,  𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑐1 = 1 𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑐2 = 1 𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑐3 = 1
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  (19) 
With this, the success probability (𝑝) of Bernoulli distribution is defined as 𝑝 = Pr(𝑋𝑖 = 1) =
1 − Pr (𝑋𝑖 = 0). A node observes similar messages as 𝑋~𝑓(𝑥, 𝜃), where 𝑓(𝑥, 𝜃) represents the 
conditional density over data vector X given the parameter  𝜃 ∈ Θ . Where, Θ  denotes the 
parameter space as Θ = {Θ0: 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒, Θ1: 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒} with prior density 𝜋(𝜃) for 𝜃 
on Θ.  The prior 𝜋𝑖(𝜃) with support to Θ𝑖 for 𝑖 = 0,1 is given as  
𝜋𝑖(𝜃) =
𝐼(𝜃∈Θ)𝜋(𝜃)
∫ 𝜋(𝜃) 𝑑𝜃Θ𝑖
    (20) 
Where, 𝐼(. ) takes the value 1 if the given condition is satisfied, otherwise, it takes 0. The 
marginal density of X with constraints on Θ𝑖, for i=0,1 is defined as 
𝑚𝑖(𝑋) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑋|𝜃)𝜋(𝜃)Θ𝑖
  (21) 
With the prior density, the problem of comparing two competing hypothesis can be considered as  
H0:  Neighbor node 𝑆𝑗 is a benign node 
H1: Neighbor node 𝑆𝑗 is a malicious node 
Where, H0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 H1 are the null and alternative hypotheses respectively. During the hypothesis 
testing the false positive (𝛼) and false negative (𝛽) are defined as follows 
𝛼: False positive error that the decision leads to acceptance of H1, when H0 is true. 
𝛽: False negative error that the decision leads to acceptance of H0, when H1 is true. 
To minimize 𝛼 and 𝛽 values, a large number of samples are required for conventional hypothesis 
testing. However, using sequential hypothesis testing a decision can be achieved with few 
samples, and by maintaining desired 𝛼 and 𝛽 values. Since, 𝛽 is the false negative rate, 1 − 𝛽 is 
the probability of detecting a malicious node. The success probability favors H0 and the failure 
probability favors H1. The sequential hypothesis testing uses a test static 𝑇(𝑋) as the logarithm 
of ratio of marginal distributions that favor the hypothesis as follows 
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𝑇(𝑋) = ∑ 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑚1(𝑋𝑖)
𝑚0(𝑋𝑖)
)𝑛𝑖=1    (22) 
Where, 𝑛  is the number of observations. Among 𝑛 observations, let 𝛾𝑛  be the number of 
observations that 𝑋𝑖 = 1, then we rewrite 𝑇(𝑋) as 
𝑇(𝑋) = 𝛾𝑛 ln
𝑃1
𝑃0
+ (𝑛 − 𝛾𝑛) ln
1−𝑃1
1−𝑃0
    (23) 
Where, 𝑃0 = Pr(𝑋𝑖 = 1|H0) , 𝑃1 = Pr(𝑋𝑖 = 1|H1), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃0 < 𝑃1. Assigning a small value to 𝑃0 
and a large value to 𝑃1 helps the test in detecting malicious nodes accurately [38].  T(X) can be 
tested by comparing to a non-negative constant threshold (t) such that 𝑇(𝑋) ≤ 𝑡. However, two 
thresholds are required to remain the T(X) in the decision region as follows 
𝑇𝑂 = {
H0
H1
    𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒    
𝑇(𝑋) ≤ 𝑡𝑙
𝑇(𝑋) ≤ 𝑡𝑢
𝑡𝑙 < 𝑇(𝑋) < 𝑡𝑢
       (24) 
Where, TO is the test output, 𝑡𝑙  and 𝑡𝑢  are the lower and upper thresholds in which  𝑡𝑙 =
𝑙𝑛 (
𝛽∗
1−𝛼∗
), and 𝑡𝑢 = 𝑙𝑛 (
1−𝛽∗
𝛼∗
) [38]. The terms 𝛼∗ and 𝛽∗ are the user configured false positive 
and false negative values. Wall [38] has proved that this test will be terminated with probability 
one. Nodes compute the test statistic one more time with new evidences if the test statistic 
remains in between 𝑡𝑙  and  𝑡𝑢 . Average number of evidences shows the ability of SPRT in 
accepting a hypothesis with the desired number of false positive and false negative rates. 
According to Wald [38], the expected number of samples required to accept the test is given by 
𝐸[𝑛] =
𝐸[𝑇(𝑋)]
𝐸[ln
Pr(𝑋𝑖|𝐻1)
Pr(𝑋𝑖|𝐻0)
]
     (25) 
Algorithm 3 shows the evidence validation phase of SADSA method. In the next section, the 
performance of the proposed method is analyzed using the simulation. 
 
Algorithm 3: Evidence validation phase of SADSA method 
Input Evidences 𝐸𝑐1 (for case 1), 𝐸𝑐2 (for case 2) and 𝐸_𝑐3 (for 
case 3), Bernoulli random variable 𝑋𝑖, 𝑃0, 𝑃1, user configured 
false positive (𝛼∗) and false negative (𝛽∗) values. 
Output Accept the hypothesis H0 or H1 
 Start Procedure 
Step 1 Update 𝑋𝑖 according to the given input of consolidated 
evidences using Eq. (19) 
  
Step 2 Compute the test statistic T(X) using Eq. (23) 
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Step 3 Identify the decision region using Eq. (24). If 𝑇(𝑋) ≤ 𝑡𝑙 then 
accept H0 (null hypothesis) and go to step 4. If 𝑇(𝑋) ≥ 𝑡𝑢 
then accept H1 (alternate hypothesis) and terminate the test. If 
𝑡𝑙 ≤ 𝑇(𝑋) ≤ 𝑡𝑢 then go to step 5.  
  
Step 4 Initialize the evidences and stop the procedure. 
  
Step 5 Backup the current 𝑋𝑖 value to prepare for next evidences and 
to compute the test statistic one more time. 
 
V. SIMULATION STUDY 
The performance of the proposed SADSA method is analyzed using the network simulator ns-
2.35 [43]. The SADSA method is compared against DSANI [24] and RSD [27] methods. This 
section in sequel presents the simulation setup, results and the discussion, and overhead analysis.  
 
 Simulation setup 
Table 1: Simulation parameters  
Network Simulator ns-2.35 
Number of nodes 300 
Network area 100 x 100 𝑚2 
Node communication range (R) 10 meters 
Simulation time 600 seconds 
Max. Beacon interval 5.0 seconds 
Malicious nodes start time 150 seconds 
Malicious nodes 20 to 30 
𝑃0𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃1 0.1 and 0.9 
𝐷𝑡ℎ  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑡ℎ 0.5 meters 
𝛼∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽∗ 0.99 
 
Table 1 shows the important simulation parameters considered for the study. It is considered that 
initially there are no malicious nodes in the network. Malicious nodes appear in the network at 
150 seconds of simulation time. Malicious nodes are in between 20 to 30, and each malicious 
node fabricates five Sybil identities and different false location data. Malicious nodes launch 
non-simultaneous Sybil attacks as mentioned in three cases (see Section III). Malicious nodes are 
selected randomly in each simulation run. Each node sends out a beacon message consists of 
node identity and location information. Two different beacon scenarios are set for the nodes. In 
the first scenario, both benign and malicious nodes send out a beacon message uniformly in [0, 
5] seconds. In the second scenario, the beacon rate between two distinct nodes is considered as a 
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homogeneous Poisson process with a rate parameter λ.  With this, the beacon time interval 
between two nodes is modeled as 
− ln(𝑈)
𝜆
. Where, U is the uniform random number in [0, 1] and 
𝜆  is the rate parameter set for benign and malicious nodes. The beacon time interval decreases 
with respect to increase in 𝜆 value. The rate parameter for benign nodes (𝜆𝑏) is set to 0.1, and the 
rate parameter for malicious nodes (𝜆𝑚) is set to 0.2. These parameters are used to validate the 
performance of SADSA method in the case of relatively different beacon intervals. The 
following network performance metrics are considered for the evaluation 
Detection rate: It is the accuracy of the detection method for detecting malicious nodes as 
malicious. 
Error rate: It is the false detection of benign nodes as malicious.  
Number of control packets generated: It is the number of router packets generated in the 
network for execution of the method. This metric shows the communication overhead of 
the detection method. 
Energy consumption: It is the energy consumed by the nodes in the network for executing 
the detection method. This method shows the energy consumption of the method.  
Average number of samples: In this metric, evidence is considered as a sample. It is the 
average number of evidences required by the SADSA method for detecting benign and 
Sybil nodes. This metric shows the time taken by the SADSA method in accepting the 
test.  
The results presented in the next section are the average of 50 simulation runs.  
 Results and discussion 
Scenario 1: Nodes sending out beacon messages with a fixed beacon rate.  
This section presents the performance metrics such as the detection rate, error rate, 
communication overhead, energy consumption and an average number of samples required to 
accept null and alternate hypothesis is presented. In this scenario, malicious nodes launch case-3 
attack that is difficult to detect than case-1 and case-2 attacks.  
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 Figure 4: Detection rate of DSANI, RSD and SADSA methods 
Figure 4 plots the number of malicious nodes versus detection rate for DSANI, RSD and SADSA 
methods. It can be seen from the figure that the detection rate is more than 99.6% in SADSA 
method. As the number of malicious nodes is increasing the detection rate has reached 100%.  
The detection rate of DSANI and RSD methods has remained in between 96% and 99%. SADSA 
method has to collect the evidences of RSSI, location data, and timestamp of the beacon. The 
collected evidences are validated using sequential analysis for early and accurate detection of 
malicious nodes. Further, if a node suspects its neighbor as malicious then it verifies the 
neighbor claim with the help of trusted neighbors. These features have increased the accuracy of 
detecting malicious nodes in SADSA method as compared to DSANI and RSD methods.  
 
Figure 5: Error rate of DSANI, RSD and SADSA methods 
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Figure 5 shows the number of malicious nodes versus error rate for DSANI, RSD and SADSA 
methods. In this, SADSA method has a very low error rate (almost 0%). It is observed that the 
error rate of DSANI method is high as compared to RSD and SADSA methods. The false 
detection of DSANI method increases with respect to increase in communication range of nodes. 
Nodes running DSANI method needs to adjust their communication range to detect the malicious 
nodes. Therefore, in the shift of communication rages, benign nodes were falsely detected as 
malicious nodes. In case of RSD method, nodes need to compare the neighbor tables for 
identifying neighbors having the same RSSI values. While doing it, a node may misjudge a 
benign node as malicious due to the possibility of two or more benign nodes having same RSSI 
value. On the other hand, when a network is densely deployed, benign nodes can be falsely 
detected as malicious due to deviation in communication range. Nevertheless, nodes running 
SADSA method identify malicious nodes with the direct observations. In other words, the 
SADSA method is mostly node centric. Hence, nodes systematically analyze the collected 
evidences and validate them using sequential analysis. It reduces the error rate in SADSA 
method as compared to DSANI and RSD methods. 
 
Figure 6: Number of control packets generated by the network 
Figure 6 plots the number of malicious nodes versus the number of control packets generated by 
the network for DSANI, RSD and SADSA methods. It is observed from the graph that the nodes 
in the network running DSANI method have generated a very high number of control packets as 
compared to RSD and SADSA methods. It is due to the overhead of preparing the common 
neighbor set. In the case of RSD method, nodes need to share the neighbor identities having 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON SMART SENSING AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS VOL. 9, NO. 2, JUNE 2016 
671
same RSSI values in addition to HELLO packets. Nevertheless, in the SADSA method, unlike 
DSANI and RSD methods, nodes periodically transmit beacon packets to know their neighbors. 
Periodic beacons are most common in WSNs. Therefore, SADSA has low communication 
overhead as compared to DSANI and RSD methods.   
 
Figure 7: Energy consumption of DSANI, RSD and SADSA methods 
A detection method has to be energy efficient in addition to low communication overhead. 
Figure 7 plots the number of malicious nodes versus average energy consumed by the nodes in 
the network for DSANI, RSD and SADSA methods. Energy consumption of DSANI method is 
very high since the number of control packets generated is high (see Figure 6). Energy 
consumption in RSD method is due to periodic beacons and comparison of the routing table. On 
the other hand, energy consumption of nodes in SADSA method is due to periodic beacons with 
identity and location data. This, the energy consumption of the network is almost same when 
RSD and SADSA methods are employed.  
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 Figure 8: Average number of samples required to accept H0 and H1 in SADSA method 
Figure 8 plots the average number of samples required by SADSA method to accept the null 
(H0) and alternate hypothesis (H1). It is observed that the average number of samples required 
for accepting the null hypothesis is increasing with respect to increasing in the number of 
malicious nodes. The number of samples has varied in between 6.12 to 9.0. It means nodes can 
accept the null hypothesis with a maximum of nine pieces of evidence. It is also observed that 
the average number of samples required for accepting the alternate hypothesis is varied in 
between 3.84 to 4.06. It means nodes can identify malicious nodes with a maximum of four 
pieces of evidence. Since the evidences are collected during each beacon interval, the maximum 
time required to detect a benign node is 45 seconds (in this scenario, maximum beacon interval is 
5 seconds), and maximum time required to detect a malicious node is 20 seconds. In this way, 
SPRT helps the SADSA method for early detection of malicious nodes. 
Scenario 1: Beacon rate as a homogeneous Poisson process with 𝜆𝑏 = 0.1 and 𝜆𝑠 = 0.2 .  
This section presents the performance of SADSA method in the case of the unequal beacon 
intervals. It is modeled as a homogeneous Poisson process with a rate parameter 𝜆. As the value 
of 𝜆 increases, the beacon interval decreases and vice versa. With this beacon rate, all the three 
malicious cases mentioned in Section III have been validated.  
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 Figure 9: Average number of samples to accept H0 in SADSA when 𝝀𝒃 = 𝟎. 𝟏 and 𝝀𝒔 = 𝟎. 𝟐 
Figure 9 plots the number of malicious nodes versus the average number of samples required by 
the SADSA method to accept the null hypothesis in the three cases. It is observed that the case-1 
attacks are detected with a maximum of four pieces of evidence across a varying number of 
malicious nodes. In case-2 and case-3, it is observed that the number of samples required is 
steadily increasing as the number of malicious nodes increase in the network. Further, to accept 
H0 in the case-3, SADSA method took more samples as compared to case-2 attacks. This is 
because SADSA method is putting the best efforts to identify malicious nodes in irregular 
beacon intervals. 
 
Figure 10: Average number of samples to accept H1 in SADSA when 𝝀𝒃 = 𝟎. 𝟏 and 𝝀𝒔 = 𝟎. 𝟐 
Figure 10 plots the number of malicious nodes versus the average number of samples required to 
accept alternate hypothesis by SADSA method. It is observed that the average number of 
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samples required for accepting H1 has varied in between 3.42 to 3.76 in all the three cases. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that SADSA method requires a maximum of four samples to 
detect a malicious node in all the three cases. 
 
Figure 11: Detection rate of SADSA method when 𝝀𝒃 = 𝟎. 𝟏 and 𝝀𝒔 = 𝟎. 𝟐 
Figure 11 plots the number of malicious nodes versus detection rate for SADSA method. It is 
apparent that the detection rate is above 99% in all the three cases. As the number of malicious 
nodes is increasing, the detection rate is also increasing. Case-1 attacks are detected accurately 
across a varying number of malicious nodes. In case-2 and case-3 attacks, the detection rate is 
higher than 99.6% when there is a maximum number of malicious nodes in the network. 
 
Figure 12: Error rate of SADSA method when 𝝀𝒃 = 𝟎. 𝟏 and 𝝀𝒔 = 𝟎. 𝟐 
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Figure 12 plots the number of malicious nodes versus error rate for SADSA method. It is 
observed that the error rate is below 2% in all the three attack cases. The error rate of case-2 is 
steadily increased with respect to the increase in the number of malicious nodes. It is because of 
irregular beacon intervals. SADSA method analyzes the case-3 with identity and location data. 
Therefore, the low error rate has been observed for case-3 attacks as compared to case-2 attacks. 
Since the false location claims are verified with the help of trusted nodes, the error rate is very 
close to 0% in the case-3 attacks.   
Since the SADSA method considers the consolidated evidences in terms of binary values, the 
number of evidences required to store in node’s memory is directly related to the number of 
neighbors (n). Each node has to store the consolidated evidence of present and previous 
observations to compute the test statistic. Therefore, a maximum of two binary values is required 
for each neighbor to decide a hypothesis. With this, each node has to store a maximum of 2xn 
bits to run SADSA method. Further, the SADSA method is mostly node-centric. It does not 
require additional control messages other than beacon messages. Thus, the SADSA method 
works without additional communication overhead as periodic beaconing is a default 
communication paradigm to discover neighboring nodes.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE 
 
In this paper, a Sybil Attack Detection method using Sequential Analysis (SADSA) is proposed. 
It is a node-centric approach to detect the Sybil attacks. This method works in two phases, via, 
evidence collection and evidence validation. Nodes collect the evidences to reach a decision on 
detecting malicious nodes. The collected evidences are consolidated and provided as input to the 
SPRT for validation. The simulation results show that the proposed method has low 
communication and processing overhead. Further, the simulation study has shown that the 
SADSA method is robust in detecting Sybil identities with very low false positive and false 
negative rates. As a future work, we will extend the proposed method to heterogeneous and 
mobile WSNs.  
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